

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. III. No. 16.]

London, Saturday, 23d April, 1803.

[Price 10d]

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## TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EX-CHEQUER.

SIR,—Before I enter on the 3d division of my subject, to wit, a comparison between the receipts and expenditure of war, if it had continued, and the receipts and expenditure of your peace, if it continue, I think it peculiarly proper to remind you of the opinions, as to this point, given by Mr. Windham, in his speech on the Preliminary Treaty, delivered in the House of Commons, on the 4th of November, 1801. My extract will be rather long, but not longer than useful, if you, and your colleagues, give that attention to it, which it merits, and which, at the time when the speech met your ear, you were too lofty to bestow.—“The evils of war are, generally speaking, to be comprised under three heads: the loss of lives and the consequent affliction brought upon friends and families; the loss of money, meaning, by that, money expended in a way not to be beneficial to the country that raises it; and the loss of money in another sense, that is to say, money not got; by which I mean the interruption given to national industry, and the diminution of the productions thence arising, either by the number of hands withdrawn from useful labour, (which is probably however but little material), or by the embarrassments and restraints which in a state of war impede and clog the operations of commerce.—With this enumeration in our hands, let us consider, in what so very violent a degree, the present armed truce, or peace, if you choose to call it so, differs from what might have been our state, in the case so much dreaded and deprecated, of a continuation of the war.—To take the last first,—the loss of national wealth by the interruption given to commerce and industry; such is the singular nature of this war, such the unexampled consequences with which it has been attended, that it becomes a question, and one in itself of the most anxious and critical importance, on which side of the account the consequences of peace in this respect are to be placed: whether, instead of balancing the dangers of peace, if such

“there are, by accessions which it will bring to our wealth and commerce, we are not rather called upon to prove some great advantages which peace will give us in respect of security, in order to balance the diminution likely to be produced by it in our commercial opulence. That our commerce will suffer at the long run, admits, I fear, of no doubt. If my apprehensions are just, it is in the diminution of our manufactures and commerce, that the approaches of our ruin will first be felt: but is any one prepared to say that this may not happen in the first instance? We have at present, subject to the inconveniencies which war produces, nothing less than the commerce of the whole world. There is no part of the world to which our goods do not pass freely in our own ships; while not a single merchant ship, with the enemy's flag on board, does at this moment swim the ocean. Is this a state of things to be lightly hazarded? Does the hope of bettering this condition, even in the minds of those most sanguine, so much outweigh the fear of injuring it, that these opposite chances can upon the whole be stated otherwise than as destroying each other: and that of consequence, in the comparison of war and peace, the prospect of increased industry and commerce, which in general tells so much in favour of peace, must not here be struck out of the account? On this head the question between peace and war stands, to say the least of it, evenly balanced.—The next of these heads, the first, indeed, in point of consequence, but the next in the order in which it is here convenient to consider them, is the loss of lives, and the effect which war is likely to have on private and individual happiness. No man can pretend to say, that war can continue upon any footing, however restricted the circle of hostilities, without the lives of men being liable to be sacrificed; and no such sacrifice can be justified, or reconciled to the feelings of any one, but by that which must justify every such sacrifice, however great the extent—the safety and essential interests of the state.

“ But if ever there was a war in which  
 “ such sacrifices seemed likely to be few,  
 “ not as an effect of any choice of ours, but  
 “ by the necessary course of events, it was  
 “ that which we should have had to carry  
 “ on in future with the republic of France.  
 “ —The great and destructive operations  
 “ of war, the conflict of fleets or armies,  
 “ or the consumption of men in unwhole-  
 “ some climates and distant expeditions,  
 “ had ceased of themselves. I know not  
 “ what expeditions we should have had to  
 “ prosecute, unless new cases should have  
 “ arisen, similar to that of the ever-memo-  
 “ rable one of Egypt; where, the same  
 “ motives existing, we should be sorry in-  
 “ deed not to have the means of acting  
 “ upon them. But in general, our fleets  
 “ would have remained quietly at their  
 “ stations, and our armies have lived at  
 “ home: the whole question reduces itself  
 “ to a mere question of expense; and that  
 “ again pretty much to a mere question of  
 “ establishment.—The great heads of war  
 “ expenditure, the army extraordinaries,  
 “ would, in most parts, have ceased; and  
 “ in the rest, have been greatly reduced.  
 “ The chief question will be, not between  
 “ an ordinary peace establishment and a  
 “ war, such as, from circumstances, ours  
 “ has hitherto been, involving expeditions  
 “ to all parts of the globe; but between a  
 “ peace establishment, such as that which  
 “ is now declared to be necessary, and a  
 “ war, which had become, and was likely  
 “ to continue, merely defensive; in which  
 “ we should have had nothing to do, but  
 “ to maintain a competent force, with little  
 “ prospect of being obliged to make use of  
 “ it. The advocates for the present peace  
 “ must find themselves always in an auk-  
 “ ward dilemma, between economy and  
 “ safety. *We make peace in order to save our*  
 “ *money: if we reduce our establishments,*  
 “ *what becomes of our security? if we keep up*  
 “ *our establishments, what becomes of our sav-*  
 “ *ings?* Whatever you give to one object,  
 “ is unavoidably taken from the other.  
 “ The savings of the present peace, there-  
 “ fore, can be looked for only *between the*  
 “ *narrow limits of a high peace and a low war*  
 “ *establishment; or, to state the case more*  
 “ *correctly, between a high peace establish-*  
 “ *ment and a war, reduced in the manner*  
 “ *that I have described. I wish that a correct*  
 “ *estimate were formed of the difference, in*  
 “ *point of expense, between these two*  
 “ *states; recollecting always that among*  
 “ *the expenses of peace are to be counted*  
 “ *the provisions necessary against the new dan-*  
 “ *gers brought by the peace itself; the new*  
 “ *dangers for example, with which Jamaica,*

“ *and all our West-India islands are threat-*  
 “ *ened by the establishment of the French in St.*  
 “ *Domingo, and other parts in that quarter of*  
 “ *the world: the new dangers to which our*  
 “ *Empire in the East is exposed, by the re-*  
 “ *entry of the French into the peninsula of*  
 “ *India, and the cession to them, for such*  
 “ *in effect it is, of the Cape and Cochin:*  
 “ *in general, by the free passage now given*  
 “ *to their ships and armies into every part*  
 “ *of the world, and the establishment of*  
 “ *them every where in the neighbourhood*  
 “ *of our most valuable possessions.—Against*  
 “ *all these dangers war provided, as it were,*  
 “ *by its own single act. The existence of*  
 “ *our fleets upon the ocean, with an admi-*  
 “ *rality order ‘to burn, sink, and destroy,’*  
 “ *shut up at once, as under lock and key,*  
 “ *all those attempts, which are now let*  
 “ *loose, and require as many separate de-*  
 “ *fences as there are parts liable to be at-*  
 “ *tacked. A fleet cruising before Brest,*  
 “ *therefore, was not to be considered as so*  
 “ *much clear expense, to be charged to the*  
 “ *account of the war; without deducting the*  
 “ *expense of additional troops and additional*  
 “ *ships, which the absence of the fleet might re-*  
 “ *quire to be kept, for instance in the West-In-*  
 “ *dies.—With respect to home defence.*  
 “ *Considering the little reliance to be placed*  
 “ *upon the government in France, now sub-*  
 “ *sisting; the still greater uncertainty with*  
 “ *respect to any future government (such*  
 “ *as may arise at any moment); and the in-*  
 “ *creased defence necessary on land, in pro-*  
 “ *portion to the diminution of our force by*  
 “ *sea; I know not, how we can remain secure*  
 “ *with a military establishment much less*  
 “ *considerable, than that which we should have*  
 “ *had to maintain here in the case of war.—*  
 “ *Should it so happen, (and who shall say,*  
 “ *that it will not?) that our commerce, in-*  
 “ *stead of increasing, or remaining where*  
 “ *it is, should fall off; that our manufac-*  
 “ *tures should decline; that, from these and*  
 “ *other causes,—such as a great emigra-*  
 “ *tion, and considerable transfer of com-*  
 “ *mercial property;—and above all from*  
 “ *the great loss of territorial revenue, the*  
 “ *income of the state should be lessened, to*  
 “ *a degree equal only to this proposed saving,*  
 “ *then we shall have incurred all the dread-*  
 “ *ful difference to be found in our situation*  
 “ *in case of the renewal of war, and all the*  
 “ *no less serious dangers during the con-*  
 “ *tinuance of peace, absolutely for nothing.*  
 “ *—I select this only as the case which may*  
 “ *be considered as the most probable.—At*  
 “ *all events, however, and whatever be the*  
 “ *extent of those expected savings, and the*  
 “ *improvement to be made in consequence*  
 “ *in our finances, we are to estimate the*



“ evils and dangers which are to be placed  
 “ in the opposite scale, the chief of which I  
 “ have endeavoured to point out, though in  
 “ a very hasty and summary manner, in the  
 “ observations, with which I have already  
 “ troubled the House. They may be class-  
 “ ed, generally, under three heads:—*The*  
 “ *ascendency, which it is feared, France may in*  
 “ *time acquire, even in those sources of great-*  
 “ *ness, which we seem inclined to consider as a*  
 “ *substitute for all others, our manufactures*  
 “ *and commerce; supposing, as I am here*  
 “ *doing, that peace continues without in-*  
 “ *terruption, and even without any great*  
 “ *advantage being taken, of the threat*  
 “ *of a renewal of hostilities. Secondly,*  
 “ *the effect to be produced, in a peace so con-*  
 “ *stituted, by the continued use of this menace,*  
 “ —an engine of which it is difficult to cal-  
 “ culate the force, applied, as it may be, to  
 “ every point on which the interests of the  
 “ countries are opposed, and for the ac-  
 “ complishment of every object, which  
 “ France may wish to attain. Thirdly and  
 “ lastly, *war itself; begun of course at such*  
 “ *moment, as France shall judge most advan-*  
 “ *tageous to her, and when by a due improve-*  
 “ *ment of the preceding period of peace,*  
 “ *Great Britain shall have been placed in a*  
 “ *situation to be least capable of resisting its*  
 “ *effects.*”

Such, Sir, were the opinions, to which you  
 ought to have listened, at a time, when it  
 was not too late to profit from them. The  
 preliminary treaty was, indeed, signed; but,  
 previous to the conclusion of the definitive  
 treaty, France had furnished you with ample  
 grounds, whereon to break off the nego-  
 tiation; and therefore, you have no justi-  
 fication for having neglected the advice,  
 conveyed in these opinions. The evils of  
 peace, as to the aggrandizement of France,  
 the influence of her menaces, and the re-  
 commencement of war, are now become  
 conspicuous even to the blindest and most  
 besotted of the people: it only remains to  
 be shown, that, to counterbalance these  
 evils, nothing is to be found in the pecuniary  
 effects, hitherto produced, or likely here-  
 after to be produced, by the peace, if it  
 should continue. This is the object of the  
 comparison, on which I am now about to  
 enter, between the receipts and expenditure  
 of war, and those of peace.

The receipts naturally demand the prefe-  
 rence; and, under this head I shall take a  
 view, first, of the net produce of the per-  
 manent taxes during the last year of war,  
 and the first year of peace; and, next, of  
 the net produce of the same taxes, during  
 the last quarter of war and the last quarter  
 of peace; after which I shall show the

effects of peace on our manufactures and  
 navigation, as far as this can be done from  
 the accounts hitherto laid before the House  
 of Commons.—My comparison between the  
 receipts of the permanent taxes of the last  
 year of war and the first year of peace will  
 be founded on the authority of the account  
 of those receipts laid before parliament, and  
 ordered to be printed on the 6th of Decem-  
 ber, 1802, and which account is made up to  
 the 10th of October, 1802, the close of the  
 first year of peace.—The total amount of  
 the permanent taxes in the year ending on  
 the 10th of October, 1801, is £22,986,309,  
 while that amount in the year ending on the  
 10th of October, 1802, is £25,199,088; so  
 that, were I, like those who were so ready  
 to give you an eighteen years' lease of the  
 Treasury Bench, to look at nothing but  
 these totals, I should, with them, believe,  
 perhaps, that the addition of £2,212,779 is  
 to be regarded amongst “ the blessings of  
 “ peace.” But, a no very sedulous appli-  
 cation of the humble quality of industry,  
 has taught me to perceive, and, of course, to  
 detect, this attempt at deception. In the  
 account, to which I am now referring, the  
 produce of those taxes *only*, which are *now in*  
*existence*, is included. Of course, the taxes  
 laid so recently as to be received in the first  
 year of peace, and not to be received in the  
 last year of war, must be excluded from  
 the effects of peace; for, if, as soon as  
 peace was made, a pole tax, for instance, of  
 a guinea a head, had been laid upon the  
 people, no one would be mad enough to re-  
 gard the addition thereby made to the re-  
 venue as an effect of peace, and as an item  
 to be put into the scale against the produce  
 of the revenue in war. The produce, there-  
 fore, of the new taxes, which were not im-  
 posed, or which did not come into operation,  
 in the last year of war, and which did come  
 into operation in the first year of peace, must  
 be excluded from this comparison altogeth-  
 er; for, if you say, that it was peace  
 which enabled you to impose and collect  
 these new taxes, my answer is, that war  
 enabled your predecessor to impose and col-  
 lect the *convoy duty* and the *income tax*, both  
 of which are excluded from the account  
 laid before Parliament. Turn, then, Sir, to  
 the taxes *pro anno* (why is this pedantry  
 persevered in?), 1800, and you will find,  
 that only a *part* of those taxes were collected  
 in the last year of war. Here, therefore,  
 we must begin to exclude; we must take  
 from the proceeds of both the years, between  
 which we are to draw our comparison, that  
 of all the taxes, laid on since 1800, inclu-  
 sive. All the taxes, imposed before that  
 time, were come into full operation in the

last year of war, and the net produce of them, in the two years respectively, according to your own account, was as follows:

In the year ending 10th Oct. 1801, being the last year of war .....	£22,035,109
In the year ending 10th Oct. 1802, be- ing the first year of peace .....	21,933,449
Less in the first year of peace than in the last year of war .....	101,660

Now, Sir, I do not stop here to say, that your account up to the 10th of October last was false, still less do I charge you with falsehood; but, I insist, that the account, as a comparative view of the produce of peace and that of war, tended to produce a false impression in the minds of those, to whom it was presented; and, that it really did produce such an impression is evident from the praises bestowed on your brilliant financial display.

You will say, perhaps, that peace had not, on the 10th of October, 1802, arrived at its full operation in favour of finance; and, indeed, you stated, in your speech of the 10th of December, that we had a growing revenue, to which we might look with comfort and confidence. Let us, then, take the net produce of the same taxes during the last quarter of war, and compare it with that of the last quarter of peace, ending on the 5th January, 1803; (1) for, as to the quarter ending on the 5th of the present month, you will, I am sure, have too much modesty to suffer any account of that to get out of the Treasury, until some one calls for it in the House of Commons.

In the quarter ending 10th Oct. 1801, being the last quarter of war .....	£6,154,421
In the quarter ending 5th Jan. 1803, being the last quarter of peace .....	6,003,704
Less in last quarter of peace than in last quarter of war .....	148,717

The next point of comparison, which I shall take, is that which relates to British produce and manufactures exported, as the same are stated in the account laid before the House of Commons, ordered to be printed on the 5th of the present month of April. And here I shall be compelled to give another striking instance of your profound ignorance, or of your adventurous duplicity.—First, however, it is necessary to observe, that, in drawing a comparison as to exports, as well as imports, we must not proceed upon the principle of positive

(1) See Accounts laid before the House of Lords, ordered to be printed 3d March, 1803, which will be inserted in the Supplement to this volume.

increase, but upon that of relative increase. If we have been increasing, year after year, during war, we must not content ourselves with a comparison between the last year of war and the first year of peace; but must go further back, in order to see, whether we have increased more or less, during peace than we increased during war. The depreciation of money, and various other causes, render an increase necessary to make our situation, in this respect, as good as it has been; notwithstanding, therefore, the exports of the first year of peace may be greater than those of the last year of war, yet, if the increase be not as great as it was, upon an average, during war, peace has produced a diminution in this part of our trade. Let us, then, take your account for the last five years, because it was not till then that the real, or declared, value was ever stated, in this sort of accounts.

Years.	Offic. Value.	Real or declared Value.
1798	19,672,503	33,148,682
1799	24,084,213	38,942,498
1800	24,304,283	39,471,203
1801	25,699,809	41,770,354
1802	27,012,108	48,500,683

Now, Sir, before I state my comparison of the increase of war with that of peace, I must beg you to accompany me in a few remarks on the statement here given of the exports of last year, as compared with your estimate thereof, in your speech of the 10th of December, where you stated that the total amount of the real or declared value of the British produce and manufactures, exported in 1802, "would not fall short of £50,000,000 sterling, being an increase of £8,000,000 above the year preceding; and compared with any former year, the increase would be still more extraordinary!" (2) Not so extraordinary as the increase of your folly, or something worse, of which no words that I can command are capable of furnishing an adequate description!—In the first place, the real, or declared, value, even or according to this account, is only £48,500,683, which falls a million and a half short of your estimate of the 10th of December. But, this is a trifle, when compared to the deception, which the account itself is calculated to convey, and which it has conveyed, to the minds of the Parliament and the people. The official value is a mode of rating, in the offices, intended to show the quantity rather than the real worth of goods exported; because, till the

(2) See Register, Vol. II. p. 782. See also, the same speech in a twelve-penny pamphlet, p. 23.



convoy duty was imposed, there was no way of coming at any thing approaching a certainty as to the real value of such goods as paid no duty on exportation, which formed the far greater part of the whole of the exports. When the convoy duty was imposed, the shipper was taxed according to the real value of his goods; and, in order to come at that value, the offices exacted a declaration of it from him, reserving, the power, if they suspected deception, of taking the goods for the account of government, and paying the shipper agreeably to the value stated in his declaration. Thus originated the statement, in these parliamentary accounts, of what is called the real, or declared, value, as well as of the official value, the statement of which was very properly continued.—Now, then, Sir, look at the five years, which I have here taken from your account, and explain to me, if you can, how it happens, that the real or declared value, which, during the four first years, bear a regular proportion of about *two thirds* above the official value, rises, all of a sudden, in the fifth and last year, to more than *three-fourths* above the official value! The cause, Sir, is this: The convoy duty was taken off after the ratification of the preliminary articles of peace, while the declaration of the real value was continued for the information of Parliament; but the shippers of goods, who had, during the collection of that duty, always declared the value as low as they could venture to do it, and (no oath being required of them) sometimes a great deal lower than the real value, had, after the convoy duty was taken off, no motive whatever to declare the value a farthing lower than it was, and, in most instances, they would, and did, from the desire to appear of consequence, declare the value as much above, as they had before declared it under, the reality. The export-duty, by which the convoy duty was re-instated, did not commence its operation till the 12th of May, 1802, (3) so that, there were, during 1802, the first year of peace, four months and a half, during which there was no way of coming at the real value of the British produce and manufactures exported. If you tell me, that there were October, November, and December, of 1801, liable to the same objection, because the convoy duty ceased, with the ratification of the preliminaries, I reply, that the duty was collected long after that event took place, and was afterwards returned to those who had paid it, and that, in December, there is, hardly any manufactured goods shipped; so

that, no obstacle, of any moment, as to the ascertaining of the real value in 1801, ever existed, while that obstacle did exist, in full force, during one half of the shipping season of 1802. (4)—Returning, therefore, to the official value, as to the only criterion whereon any dependence can be placed, and giving the real or declared value of 1802 the same proportion above the official value, which it has in the preceding years, we shall find your £50,000,000 fall down to about £45,000,000, which, though it gives an increase to this your first year of peace, does not render peace, in this respect, equal to war.—Referring to the account for the years above particularized, we perceive, that the average annual increase, from 1798 to 1801, was £2,009,102, and if we add this sum to the amount of 1801, we shall find the total to surpass the amount of 1802; thus:

Official Value of Exports in 1801 (5)	£25,699,809
Add average annual increase, during the war .....	2,009,102
	<hr/> 27,708,911
Deduct Official Value of Exports in 1802 .....	27,012,108
	<hr/>
Annual increase of peace less than annual increase of war .....	696,803

Let us now, Sir, see what effect peace has had upon the navigation of the country.

(4) There has been another co-operating cause: I mean the tax on imports and exports, which has been collected since the 12th of May, 1802, and which has, in various ways, raised the price of the goods exported. The rise in the price of cotton and of Spanish wool, owing to the prospective loss of the conquered colonies, and also owing to the vexatious restrictions which France has imposed on Spain, has also contributed to swell out the amount of the declared value. The price of the exported manufactures being raised is an alarming circumstance, because it must tend to create manufactures in other countries; but, that which is matter of deep regret with other men, is a source of consolation and the subject of boast with Mr. Addington.

(5) It is worthy of remark, that this sum of £25,699,809, falls short of what it ought to be by £20,170. The account, laid before Parliament, last year, stated the official value of the exported produce and manufactures of 1801, at £25,719,979, of course, the present statement falls short by the sum just mentioned. How is this? Was there an error committed last year? Or is there a little trick played this year, in order to produce deception? At any rate, one of the accounts is wrong, *absolutely false*, which is the less excusable, though not, perhaps, the more surprising, as the latter account, to which we are inclined to attribute the falsehood, was moved for by the celebrated Mr. George Rose, sometime Secretary of the Treasury.—And these are financiers! These are the accounts, on which we are told to place implicit reliance!

(3) See Act 43 Geo. III. Cap. 43.

And here I have to regret, that my materials are not more ample. In your ever-memorable speech of the 10th of December last, you talked much about an increase of navigation, produced by the peace, but confessed, at the same time, that your estimate would only be partial, as the accounts were made up for none of the ports, except that of London. *Why* they were not, you did not think it necessary to state, and the persons to whom you addressed yourself, were too delicate to put the question to you; so that, upon a subject involving the vital interests of the country, the House of Commons, have, from that day to this, received no regular, official and authentic information, except as far as relates to the ships built and registered, during the three last years of the last peace, the three last years of the war, and the first year of peace. The House has, indeed, somewhere, on, or under, its table, petitions from the ship-owners in the several ports of Gt. Britain, stating amongst other things well worth the attention of a Member of Parliament, that, since the peace, "the shipping" of Great Britain *has fallen in value* from "thirty pounds to forty pounds per cent.;" but, as far as rests with you and your colleagues, the only document before the House and the Public, is, the account which I have above described, and which was ordered to be printed on the 8th of March last. This account contains the following statement:

Years.	Vessels	Tons.
1799	689	83,658
1800	845	115,349
1801	918	110,200
1802	967	104,789 (4)

The number of vessels is of little consequence. It is the number of tons which must form the criterion; and, here we perceive, at once, that, in a positive comparison, the first year of peace falls more than 5,000 tons below the last year of war. But, we must not stop there. By the account, to which I am now referring you, it appears, that the ships built and registered in 1799, contained no more than 57,137 tons, so that, in the space of twelve years, the annual construction of shipping has been almost doubled. Confining ourselves, however, to the last three years of the war, we find an average annual increase, since 1799, of 29,119 tons, and, of course, the year 1802, the first year of peace, falls below what it ought to be as follows:

(4) The whole of this account, for all the different ports in Great Britain, will be found in the Supplement to this volume.

	Tons.
British vessels built and registered in 1801	110,206
Add average annual increase, during last years of war	29,119
	139,325
Deduct vessels built and registered in 1802	104,789
Annual increase of peace less than annual increase of war	34,536

An account of the number of men and tons of shipping, in the merchant service, sailing inwards and outwards, during the aforementioned years, would have been more satisfactory, particularly if made up with a due regard to the spirit of truth; but, as no such account has yet been presented, we must, for the present at least, look upon that which we have just examined as containing a proof of a small positive decline, and of a very considerable comparative decline, in the mercantile marine of the country.

Thus, Sir, in whatever light I consider the subject, wherever I seek, and in whatever way I turn the materials of comparison, I find the first year of peace to have produced a diminution in the revenue, as well as in the means by which that revenue is fed and protected. And, if such have been the effects of the first year of peace, what would be the effects of the second, the third, and the fourth year; especially if you and your colleagues were to be the instruments of preserving to us this "blessing?" During the first year, we had the commerce from and to the conquered colonies, for nine months at least; and, as every thing which could possibly be exported from and imported to those colonies, was, for reasons too obvious to mention, so exported and imported, before those fatal sisters, your "peace and plenty," had for ever cut off the communication between those colonies and England, the nine months of last year, was, with respect to this very considerable branch of trade, more than equal to any former twelve months. The first year of peace was extremely favourable, too, with respect to the internal revenue. Sailors and soldiers were brought home and discharged: their pay fell, in great part, into the excise, instead of being spent abroad. The harvest was excellent, bread and other provisions, which had fallen considerably towards the end of the war, were reduced very much in price, and the people were, in consequence, enabled to spend more of their money on taxable commodities. But, all these, except the harvest, are temporary causes; and that too must be considered as such in a com-

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parison between the effects of peace and those of war. The conquered colonies and their million and a half of revenue are gone never to return, and, with them, forty millions of British capital have been transferred to Holland and France; that is to say, to France alone. Peace did, indeed, bring home the soldiers and sailors, but this can take place only once during the peace, and it might have taken place equally well during such a war as we should have had to carry on: at any rate, it is an advantage not to be enjoyed this year, or in any future year of peace. And, as to the plenteous harvest, with all its numerous advantages, you will hardly pretend that they arose from the peace, seeing that the corn was safe in the mow, previous to the signature even of the preliminaries.—If, then, we find, that the first year of peace has had some great advantages, as to revenue, over the last year of war, which no future year of peace can possibly have; and if, notwithstanding these advantages, we find it to sink, not only in point of pecuniary product, but in the evidences of those means from which that product must arise, and by which it must be protected, must we not necessarily conclude, that peace, should it continue, will, in a pecuniary point of view, be less productive than war, if war had been continued?

*The Expenditure* of war, if war had continued, compared with the expenditure of the present peace, if it continue, is the only remaining point of my proposed inquiry. —A favourite fallacy, employed by you, your colleagues, and your defenders, is, ever to speak of the expenses of war, if it had continued, as admitting of no diminution. Upon this notion it was, that you grounded your assertion, that another year of war would have cost £40,000,000 (5), and, more recently, that the annual savings of peace would be about £25 000,000 (6). But, Sir, is there a man in the kingdom, who must not perceive, that the war, if continued, must either have admitted of a vast diminution, in point of expense, or must have greatly added to our resources by new and most profitable conquests? It is not necessary, for my present purpose, to enquire, whether the war ought, in future, to have been more of an offensive than of a defensive nature; whether directed to new acquisitions, or solely to the retention of what we already possessed; all that I have to do is to prove, that the latter object might have been effected with an expenditure not ex-

ceeding what will be absolutely requisite for the maintenance, in peace, of what your peace has left us to maintain. “The great heads of war expenditure,” as Mr. Windham observed, “the *army extraordinaries*” [to which he might have added great part of the *navy extraordinaries*] “would, if war had been continued, have ceased, in most parts of the world, and, in the rest, have been greatly reduced. The chief question,” said he, “will be, not between an ordinary peace establishment, and a war, such as, from circumstances, ours has hitherto been, involving *expeditions to all parts of the globe*; but between a peace establishment such as ours will be, and a war, which had become, and was likely to continue, merely defensive, in which we should have had nothing to do, but to maintain a competent force, with little prospect of being obliged to make use of it. . . . The savings of the present peace, therefore, can be looked for only between the narrow limits of a high peace and a low war establishment; or, to state the case more correctly, between a high peace establishment and that of a war, reduced in the manner that I have described. I wish, that a correct estimate were formed of the difference, in point of expense, between these two states; recollecting always, that, among the expenses of peace are to be counted the *provisions against the new dangers brought by the peace itself*.”—To make this estimate correctly is impossible; because no one can tell what these new dangers, and the consequent provisions against them, will be. All that we know, at present is, that, in consequence of the peace, a very considerable augmentation of our naval force, in the West-Indies, has been found necessary, and that no reduction of our naval or military force in the East-Indies is thought of; for that the troops at the Cape, were to go, and, perhaps, are gone, to reinforce the peninsula of India against the dangers created by the surrender of Cochin and the Cape. But, the fairest way of coming at a probable estimate of the difference, which we want to ascertain, is, first to consider, on the side of war, all expeditions, at an end, and, of course, to deduct their attendant expenses; and next, on the side of peace, to take your own last estimates of the expenses of peace, and add thereto, for the present year, the expenses which will arise from preparations for war, should those preparations be discontinued in the course of a month or six weeks from this time.—The naval and military expenses of the last year of war, were,

(5) See Register, Vol. II. p. 1149 and (6) 1705.

in the account laid before Parliament on the 6th of May, 1802, stated as follows (7):

NAVY.			
Salaries to the Admiralty, and other offices	£76,000	0	0
Wages, bounty, flag-pay, half pay, and pensions	2,329,670	15	0
Dock-yards, buildings, stores, pilotage, and contingencies	7,133,008	2	5½
Marine service on shore	327,000	0	0
Victualling department	5,577,500	2	9½
Sick and wounded do.	515,000	0	0
Transport do—or transports	1,209,192	0	11
Prisoners of war in health	76,000	0	0
Miscellaneous services	60,000	0	0

Total of the Navy ..... 17,303,371 1 2

## ORDNANCE.

The whole of the ordnance. . . 2,165,911 10 5½

## ARMY.

For regulars, fencibles, militia, invalids, and volunteer corps	7,632,846	15	3
Barracks	651,840	0	0
Staff officers and officers of garrison	100,658	7	6
Half-pay	194,900	0	0
Widows' pensions	23,500	0	0
Chelsea Hospital	132,970	9	8
Exchequer fees	66,631	10	8
Pay of public offices	34,860	8	8
Extraordinary services	5,347,174	0	0

Total of the Army ..... 14,185,382 0 9

— Navy ..... 17,303,371 1 2

— Ordnance ... 2,165,911 10 5½

Grand Total..... 33,654,665 0 4½

Such, Sir, were the whole of the naval and military expenses during the last year of war; and, though we cannot ascertain with exactness, we may with tolerable precision, what part of these expenses belonged exclusively to *expeditions*, which had nothing to do with the defence of any part of our dominions, in any part of the world. There were, during this last year of war, three expeditions of this stamp, that to the Baltic, that against Boulogne, and the ever-memorable one to Egypt. The army extraordinary will be seen to amount to £3,347,174, and, by referring to the distribution of that sum, it will be perceived, that more than £3,500,000 of it was occasioned by the expeditions, to which must be added about £1,200,000 for the ordinary service of the army, in the expeditions, during that year. Under the head of the navy, we must deduct, almost the whole of the sum for transports £1,209,192; also the expenses of the fleet to the Baltic, and of the fleet under Lord Keith, which, including victualling, stores, repairs, and contingencies, cannot be

estimated at less than £3,000,000. If to these sums we add, only £700,000, as a proportionate reduction on account of dock-yard and building expenses, and £650,000, as a proportionate reduction in the ordnance, we shall find, that the whole reduction will amount to £10,259,192, which will bring the annual expenses of war, such as war would have been, had it been continued, down to £23,395,473. Taking, then, your peace establishment, according to your own estimate, and adding thereto £5,500,000 for the present armament, and comparing these with the above reduced war establishment, we shall come at the difference, which we have been seeking to ascertain.

Expenditure of one year of war, such as the war would have been, had it been continued ..... £23,395,473

Peace establishment as voted by Parliament

for the present year... £14,957,325

Expense of the armament 5,500,000

20,457,325

Less expenditure during the present year of peace, than would have been necessary for each year of war, if war had continued ..... 2,938,148

Thus, Sir, without withdrawing a single ship from blockading the ports of our enemies, from the numerous cruises against the remnant of their commerce, or from the protection of our own commerce, colonies, and coasts; without discharging a single soldier, except in number equal to, or a little above, that of the army of Egypt, which we should not have wanted; without putting into the hands of our enemy those outworks of India, Malta, and the Cape; without laying down any one means of defence, or giving up any one of these conquests, which would, in any hands but yours, have always been the price of honourable, solid, and permanent peace and security; without making any of these sacrifices, we could have kept steadily on at an expenditure only £2,938,148 above that which is necessary to preserve a diminished commerce, a shaken credit, a curtailed dominion, and a degraded and dishonoured country.—But, you will say, perhaps, that the present armament ought not to be regarded as an annually recurring expense. And, do you really think so, Sir? “Do you, in good sooth, Master Shallow, believe this thing?” If you do, you are not less deceived by your hopes than the stockholders and loan-jobbers have been by your financial representations. The Secretary at War stated the present army to be necessary, because France possessed such a mighty establishment; and, must not your means





of defence increase in proportion as her means of offence increases? If 50,000 seamen, as a peace establishment, are wanted now, how many will be wanted, when France has had another year of uninterrupted preparation? When she has had a year's produce of the colonies of Holland and of the mines of Spain; when she has concentrated the maritime force of all her dependents, and added it to that of her revived and augmented navy; when she has completely subdued St. Domingo, gotten Louisiana safe within her grasp, stationed her armies at Cochin and the Cape, and swept the Mediterranean of British armies and British fleets? Do you hope, that Buonaparté will cease his endeavours to envelope our territories, to menace, to alarm, to harrass us, and to ruin our finances and our credit? As well may this humbled and degraded nation hope, that its base forbearance will make you cease lavishing its treasures on your insatiable relations. No, no. The Consul sees too clearly the way of destroying the only power on earth, which has the means of frustrating his ambitious, but, perhaps, indeed, his laudable views; for, he really seems to be designed, by a justly offended Providence, as the scourge of a people no longer worthy to be free. To effect this destruction, to produce confusion and revolution in this country, he has only to pursue his present line of policy, only to keep us in a state of armed peace, in which we shall see our expenditure constantly exceed our receipts, without the hope of a change for the better. The expenditure and income of the nation stand thus:

Permanent annual charge on account of national debt, civil list, and parliamentary grants	£24,631,931
Navy, army, ordnance, and miscellaneous, for the present year, exclusive of the portion to be paid by Ireland	18,457,325
Total expenditure	43,089,256
Total income	32,270,604
Annual deficiency, to be raised by loan, or by new taxes	£10,818,652

This is the true statement, Sir. You may stave off the evil; you may coin Exchequer bills on aids; you may make use of what shifts or what cant you please; you may shuffle your estimates backwards or forwards as it best suits your purpose, and as is best adapted to the humour of your audience; but, to this statement, to this black account, or to a sponge, you and your peace must finally bring us, unless there is yet sense and courage enough left in the country, once

more to take up arms, with a firm and unalterable resolution never to lay them down again, until such a peace can be obtained as will, by a reduction of establishments, enable us to bring our expenses down to a level with our income. — I am, &c. &c.

WM. CORBETT.

Duke Street, West. 20th April, 1803.

#### THE BLOCKS!

We select the following as the best solutions of the Charade in our last, p. 555.

#### I.

Two years' blockading made fair Malta ours:  
A noble struggle! — yet 'tis thought (*at Reading*)  
That Britain's Island shews superior pow'rs,  
To bear, and to survive, *two years* block-head-  
ing!

#### II.

Does the Head of the Cab'net, that "safe politician,"  
With *Blocks* guard the Thames' sacred tide! —  
Forbid, ye brave Britons, the *Blockhead's* ambition,  
O'er the helm of the state to preside!  
*Reading, April 17.* MASTER SHALLOW.

#### BLOCKS.

#### An Ode.

#### I.

Since now to *blocks*, and not *blockades*,  
We mean to trust, when France invades,  
Or threats, to sink our stocks;  
If thou awhile canst leave the *Nore*,  
Dulness! inspire one *blockhead* more  
To speculate on *blocks*.

#### II.

And O! how largely *blocks* conduce  
To arts of elegance, and use!  
Much as our pride it shocks,  
Truth yet compells us to confess,  
Man would be often in distress,  
Without the help of *blocks*.

#### III.

For *blocks* our riggers call amain  
To fit our *fifty sail* — in vain!  
Five now exhaust our docks.  
The broken contract is restor'd,  
With two old *Logs*\* and one new Board,  
St. VINCENT yet wants *blocks*.

#### IV.

From *blocks* the types of *Bewick* grew:  
Hence *Bewick's* graver, softly true,  
All nature's stores unlocks;  
See too in stone from *Bacon's* hand  
The peace-maker of *Amiens* stand,  
Colossal *block* of *blocks*!

\* "Two old Logs." — We believe these to be the same as the "*two Phloes*," whom we have often had occasion to mention. Every body knows, that a seaman's *log* is a piece of wood, loaded with a quantity of lead, to make it lie a dead weight on the surface of the water. It is of no use till it is thrown out. *Phloes* we call, in English, "*sea-anchors*," because they make a noise, like that of a calf. The thing is all one, as honest Fluellen says, save only variations of phrases.



## V.

And what are heads, which most we prize,  
Heads of the fair, and of the wise,  
From Misses in white frocks,  
To Judges, and the Speaker's chair;—  
Except when ADDINGTON was there?  
Their wigs reply—"our blocks."

## VI.

To *upping-blocks* what thanks we owe,  
The rise of ADDINGTON may show,  
Tho' now PITT's aid he mocks:  
And future caution may be taught,  
As PITT perhaps of late has thought,  
By former *stumbling-blocks*.

## VII.

Once, to sustain the British name,  
When Britain's safety stood on fame  
Unshaken as her rocks,  
No art our Fathers knew but this:  
For ministers, who did amiss,  
They recommended *blocks*.

## VIII.

What, since THE FAMILY controuls,  
Is public life? A game at bowls,  
Where, after rubs and knocks,  
The players, who well-skill'd to win  
By wheeling round at last come in,  
Get side by side with *blocks*.

## IX.

Then cease, ye scribblers, cease your wit:  
Among yourselves, as you think fit,  
Scratch, peck, be Bantam-cocks;  
But let our Ministers alone:  
Lost is your labour, you will own,  
With razors cutting *blocks*.  
Plymouth. TIMOTHY TINBLOCK.

## THE DOCTOR DEFENDED BY PRECEDENT.

Doctors of yore, with looks profound,  
And *Roguelature*, trailing to the ground,  
And sage full-bottom'd tie,  
Call'd to a ease, first took their fee,  
Then bled and purg'd their man, till he  
Died from debility.

Our Doctor's practice is the same,  
To Park and Lodge he makes his claim,  
In Richmond's Palace dwells;  
Gives Navy Purse to brother Bragge,  
Hidesy secures the Army-bag,  
Young *Eolus* bolts the Pills.

The patient next, so high in blood!  
Cupp'd, bled, and purg'd, as he thinks good,  
He lowers to such condition;  
That while he swears she's sweetly dozed,  
And safe, in peace serene, composed,  
She dies of her Physician.

## THE DOCTOR'S EXCUSE.

Says a Friend to the Doctor, "Pray, Doctor, take  
care,  
You'll ruin your Patient before you're aware;  
You've feather'd your nest—then no longer de-  
ceive her—  
Your nostrums will kill her—she's now in a fe-  
ver—  
" 'Tis true, (says the Doctor), such symptoms I  
trace;  
But really, dear Sir, I can't give up my place."  
BOLUS.

The Origin of the prevailing Influenza, called "LA  
GRIPPE." \* A SILL BUS

While the Faculty doubt whence *La Grippe* can  
arise,  
The DOCTOR, in every thing EQUALLY wise,  
From himself the infection can trace.—  
The symptoms, a heaviness fix'd in the head,  
A weakness that rules, whilst all vigour is fled,  
And a dread of all changes of place.

GRIPPIST.

## FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, March 4.—The following ceremo-  
nies took place when Gen. Brune, presented his  
letters of credit to the Grand Vizier and to Sultan  
Selim the 3d.—The Gen. arrived at Constantinople  
on the 6th of Jan. He sent Citizen Parandier, 1st  
Secretary to the Embassy, to notify his arrival to  
the Sublime Porte. Citizen Parandier was first  
presented by Prince Scarlate Callimachi, first Dra-  
goman of the Porte, to the Minister for internal  
affairs, the Grand Vizier, the Reis Effendi, and the  
Captain Pacha.—To these Ministers he delivered  
the notification, in the following terms:—"I have  
the honour to notify to your Excellency, the ar-  
rival of Gen. Brune, in character of Ambassador,  
nominated by the First Consul, Buonaparte,  
from the French people to the Ottoman Porte.  
—The rank which Gen. Brune occupies in the  
state, the services which he has performed at  
the head of its armies, and in the management  
of public affairs, afford a presumption to the  
Sublime Porte, that the French government re-  
gards this Embassy as a matter of the highest  
consequence. The General-Ambassador has di-  
rected me to declare, that he entertains the high-  
est respect for your Excellency, and will con-  
sider it as his duty to enter into the most friend-  
ly and unreserved conferences with your Excel-  
lency, in regard to the interests of France, and  
of the Ottoman Empire."—Citizen Parandier  
was received with the greatest distinction, seated  
beside those Ministers, and politely served with  
coffee, sherbet, and perfumes. But, on account of  
the festivals of Ramazan, and Bairam, it was found  
necessary to defer the audiences of the Ambassa-  
dor, till the 23d of Feb.—At 10 that morning, the  
Ambassador, with Parandier, his first secretary,  
and the Dragoman, sailed in a bark with 7 pair of  
oars, from Top-Hana to Vesir-Skelessi. They were  
followed by the whole train of the Embassy, in  
120 other barks, supplied by the Sublime Porte.  
At their landing, they were received by the Te-  
haux-bachi, and served with coffee, sherbet, and  
perfumes, at the Kiosk.—On 100 horses, furnished  
by the Porte, and superbly harnessed, the Amba-  
sador then proceeded, with the principal persons  
in his train, to the Porte. He alighted at the Grand  
Vizier's palace, where he was received by Prince  
Callimachi, with some other officers of distinction.  
He was conducted immediately into the hall of the  
Divan, which the Grand Vizier entered at the very  
same time by a different door. They saluted each

\* The French appellation for a disease raging  
at Paris, from which some persons conceive the  
British Influenza to have been derived. Though,  
we think the origin of the infection, as here stated,  
to be correct, we allow, at the same time, that it  
is more than probable, that the violence of the  
Doctor's symptoms has been considerably aggra-  
vated by his intercourse with France.



other. The Grand Vizier then sat down on his sofa, and the Ambassador on a chair that was placed for him opposite. The Reis Effendi, with other Ottoman Ministers, continued standing on the Grand Vizier's right hand. The Ambassador then spoke as follows, and his words were interpreted by Prince Callimachi:—"The most great, most puissant, and most magnanimous Buonaparté, First Consul of the French republic, has sent me to the Sublime Porte in the character of Ambassador. I come, according to custom, to present to your Highness, the letters by which I am invested with that eminent character. Under the auspices of a treaty, which renews the antient alliance, and by the happy disposition of the sentiments of your Highness, all the steps I shall take will tend, and succeed, I hope, to renew those ties of amity which imperious circumstances had somewhat relaxed, but which the Ottomans and the French are accustomed to regard as pledges of their common prosperity. The genius of the magnanimous First Consul, the glory which he wishes to derive from the maintenance of the peace of the world, the splendour of his innumerable victories, the peaceable situation of the powers formerly hostile to us, the weight of the French republic in the balance of the destinies of Europe, are so many pledges alike of the stability, and of the importance of our engagements. Your Highness knows, that France is the true friend and natural ally of the Ottoman Empire; that for fidelity, generosity, and greatness, the two people have no equals in the world; that they are attached to each other by the dearest interests. I think myself fortunate in having been chosen to act for the immediate preservation and improvement of this union. And I consider the honourable post I hold at the Sublime Porte, as a glorious reward for my military services. It is agreeable to me to find, in the depository of the confidence of his Highness, the Sultan Selim the third, a Grand Vizier, who is a warrior, and whose loyalty and wisdom cannot but smooth all the difficulties which I might otherwise find in the way of my new career."—The Grand Vizier made the following reply, which was interpreted to the Ambassador by Prince Callimachi:—"The Sublime Porte having received the highest satisfaction from the renewal and confirmation of its antient and sincere friendship with the French republic; as also from the good disposition and the good-will manifested on the part of the most magnanimous First Consul, Buonaparté, towards the interests of the Ottoman Empire, will, of course, most certainly use every effort to preserve the mutual engagements, and the sincere friendship between the two powers."—"As the Sublime Porte has still more particularly received the greatest satisfaction from the attention of the most magnanimous First Consul, expressed in his choosing for this Embassy a Gen. so highly esteemed, so much considered, who has acquired so much glory, and who enjoys the personal friendship of the First Consul; the Sublime Porte is therefore persuaded, that this Ambassador, in giving on every occasion, proofs of his zeal and constant good-will, will faithfully and earnestly take every means to strengthen the ties of amity, now subsisting between the two powers." The Ambassador was then treated with sweetmeats, sherbet, and coffee, and robed in a pellice of sable skin covered with cloth of gold, such as the Pacha of 3 tails have permission to

wear. Suitable honours were at the same time paid to his secretary and the rest of his train. He returned in grand procession, as before, to the palace of France.—On the 22d of Feb. he was introduced to an audience of the Grand Signior, who received him, sitting on his throne, in the Divan. The Ambassador had, on this occasion, the honour to dine with the Grand Vizier.—The Ambassador at this audience, made the following address to the Sultan:—"Most high, most excellent, most puissant, most magnanimous, and invincible Emperor of the Mussulmans, Sultan Selim, in whom honour and virtue shine.—The most high, most puissant, and most magnanimous First Consul of the French republic, Buonaparté, sends me to your Sublime Porte in the quality of Ambassador. These are the letters of credit, by which he invests me with this character. I have directions, while I present them to your Highness, to congratulate you on the fortunate conclusion of a peace, which re-establishes the antient relations of amity, and to testify that the most magnanimous First Consul of the French republic warmly interests himself in the glory and prosperity of your reign.—It is that republic, that great empire, of which I am the Ambassador, that by me offers to you its most zealous wishes for perfect mutual amity. Fidelity and generosity are the virtues equally of the French and of the Ottomans. This similarity of character is a natural tie between them. It was confirmed by long habit. All their mutual interests concurred to strengthen it. I take the greater pleasure in the commission intrusted to me, since I every day perceive that the same justice and greatness of soul which animate your Highness, have passed into the minds of those enlightened men to whom you have confided the different parts of your immense power. Happy to have to testify to your Highness the sentiments of unalterable friendship entertained towards you by the First Consul, I am still more happy to have it in my power to inform my government, that I have been witness of the respectful love borne towards you by all true Mussulmans, and that I have had proofs from your Highness and your Ministers, of an high good-will, which evinces that you have preserved a great attachment in your heart for the most antient and most constant of your allies. I pray Almighty God for the happiness of your people, to prolong your life without pain or trouble, and to make your glory and wisdom to enlighten the whole universe."—The Grand Vizier made, in the name of his Sovereign, the following reply to this address:

"It is on the part of the most high, most august, and most powerful, his most gracious Lord and Master, that his Highness the Grand Vizier replies to your Excellency, and earnestly expresses the satisfaction which his Highness the Sultan feels in the renovation of the friendship between the Sublime Porte and the French republic; and in the good intention and sincere sentiment, manifested on the part of the most magnanimous First Consul, Buonaparté; and at the same time assures you of the disposition and attention of his Highness the Sultan to strengthen, by all means, the ties of the sincere and intimate friendship between the two powers."—The French Ambassador received, in the evening, the compliments of all the other Foreign Ministers at Constantinople. (*Moniteur*)

Paris, April 13.—Official dispatches, addressed from St. Domingo to the minister of marine by the Gen. in Chief, announce, under date of the 3d and 4th of March, that 4000 men of the French



demi-brigade, of the 60th of the line, of the 14th light infantry, and the foreign battalion, had successively arrived at the Cape in the preceding days. The rest of the reinforcements sent from France were immediately expected, to resume the offensive at all points: already the Gen. of Brigade, Lacroix, had taken by the bayonet Laxavon, and escalated the fort of Ouanaminthe.—The Brigands had again attempted to shew themselves in the plain of the Cape; the Gen. of Division, Clauzel, commanding the right of the division of the north, and the Gen. of Brigade, Claparede, had attacked and surrounded them; 500 of them remained on the field of battle; our loss did not amount to more than 40 killed and wounded.—Some movements of little importance had manifested themselves at Tortue. They were stopped by the firmness and good dispositions of Adjutant Boscus. Three hundred men, sent as a reinforcement from the Cape by the Gen. in Chief on board the Duquesne, and commanded by the Adjutant Ramel, had succeeded in exterminating the rebels.—The army occupies the whole circumference of the colony, with the exception of a few points of little importance, and which are watched by the ships of the station that cruize before them.—In the north, the environs of Laxavon and Ouanaminthe have been entirely cleared by Gen. Fermand, and those of Port-de-Paix by the Chief of the Squadron, Rupert.—Gen. Sarasin, at the head of 700 men of the 14th light infantry, had been detached to join the Black Gen. La Plume and Gen. Darbois, in the quarter of the south.—In that of the west we extend to, and take in, the Mirabelais, embracing the plains of the Cul-de-Sac, and of Croix-des-Bouquets. The Brigands are shut up in the interior, on the mountains which separate the department of the north from that of the West, and Port Republicain from Jacmel.—The chiefs of the blacks are divided amongst themselves: already some of them have shot one another.—The Spanish part of the island remains unmolested.—The marine, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Latouche, seconds with all its activity, the operations of the land forces.—(Monitor.)

*Genoa, March 26.* We are assured, that if a rupture takes place between France and England, a numerous corps of French troops will proceed to Sicily, with the consent of the King of Naples, to undertake from thence, as soon as an opportunity offers, an expedition against Malta. The coasts of Genoa and Tuscany have been put in the best state of defence. The garrisons of the islands of Elba and of Corsica have been reinforced. Gen. Morat will command in chief in Italy.

*Vienne, April 2.*—The English court has sent an officer hither, to request that a certain number of officers and common men from an excellent corps of hussars and canoneers may be permitted to enter into the English service. This request, however, has been refused.

*Amsterdam, April 6.*—The day before yesterday arrived in this city a detachment of artillery, which yesterday proceeded on its march for Dutch Brabant. Yesterday likewise, two battalions of the 10th demi-brigade passed through, taking the same route. It appears that all the French troops on this destination will be provisionally stationed in garrison or cantonment in Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, Bois-le-Duc, Huysden, Gertruydenberg, and in the environs of those frontier places, and that they will not march into the interior of the Batavian Republic, except in the case of an actual war with England.

*Hague, April 6.*—All the French troops destined for our territory have arrived at Breda, and in the environs; they consist of the 2d regiment of hussars, the 11th of dragoons, the two first battalions of the 76th demi-brigade of infantry of the line, the two first of the 48th, and several companies of artillery.—The Batavian Government has been informed, that besides the above troops, it will receive on its territory 4 battalions of infantry and 3 squadrons of the 1st regiment of hussars. These troops are expected to-morrow at Breda.

*Brussels, April 9.*—Conformably to the instructions which have been received from Paris, the following military movements have taken place: the 95th demi-brigade of the line embarked for Flushing, where it is now in garrison; the 81st demi-brigade, which was in garrison at Bruges, embarked on the 4th for Zealand; on the 6th, about 200 cannoneers embarked for the same place. Various other bodies of troops are marching towards the Frontiers of the Batavian Republic.

*Rotterdam, April 12.*—By an express order from the First Consul, the Louisiana expedition is definitively suspended. The French Gen. began the day before yesterday to debark the troops that were on board the vessels; they will proceed with the other troops newly arrived in this Republic, to different destinations both on the frontiers and elsewhere. In several of our towns, among others at Numeguen and Grave, their entrance was at first opposed by the Commandants of the Dutch garrisons; but after an ulterior explanation, these Commandants thought fit to yield to necessity and force.—The news that Flushing has been put in a state of siege, is fully confirmed. In the end of last week, an Aid-de-Camp of the First Consul arrived, to inspect the means of defence. The French Ambassador, Semonville, sent, at the same time, one of his Secretaries, who passed through this town, with a particular commission.—Gen. Monrichard has, informed the Government, that, if it shall refuse to comply with his demands relative to the subsistence and pay of the troops, he will quarter the soldiers on the inhabitants, as was done in the year 1795.

*Leyden, April 13.*—The French troops which have entered Dutch Brabant, are occupying successively the strong places in this and the other neighbouring Departments. In the mean time, an English squadron has made its appearance off Scheveuing; and the French troops which had embarked at Helvoersluys for Louisiana, began, on the 10th inst. to disembark.

## DOMESTIC.

*From the London Gazette.—Downing-Street, April 19, 1803.*—The King has been pleased to appoint James Gambier, Esq. to be his Majesty's Consul-General at Lisbon.

*Bankrupts.*—Rawstone, J. Pontefract, merchant.—Walker, W. Jun. Kingston-upon-Hull, merchant.—Slade, T. M. Old Bond-street, picture dealer.—Halstead, R. Worsthorn, near Burnley, calico manufacturer.—Hustler, J. Weston Colville, farmer.—Dawson, W. Jun. Liverpool, merchant.

## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**CHANGE OF MINISTRY.**—Before this sheet reaches the hands of our readers, they will have learnt, through various other channels, that our opinion, with regard to a junction



between Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt, has been completely verified; and that, whatever other parts of Mr. Pitt's recent conduct they may have to lament, this sign of voluntary debasement is not to be added to the number.—The negotiation, as it has been called, for a partial change in the ministry, never, we believe, proceeded further than an overture to that effect, on the part of Mr. Addington, seconded, probably, by Lord Melville and by the joint intreaties of those gemini of the ministerial zodiac, Messrs. Rose and Long. Mr. Pitt, however, it is now well understood, never listened to the proposition; and, without believing his mind to have undergone a complete revolution, without believing imbecility and selfishness to have supplanted wisdom and a love of fame, it is impossible to suppose that he could. For, as we before observed, it is evident, that, in joining the present ministers, he would, in the eyes of all sensible men, have taken upon himself the whole of the responsibility attached to every one of their measures; and, would, besides, have justly exposed himself to the imputation of having, under a feigned pretext, broken up the former ministry, of having inveigled his colleagues out of their share of the powers of the state, in order, when a convenient opportunity offered, to resume the reins with none but his own low creatures about him, and thus to become the unchecked ruler, the absolute DICTATOR of the nation. We do not congratulate him on having escaped this danger; because, we always thought his own high and honourable mind a sufficient protection against it; and, both he and the public will do us the justice to acknowledge, that we never have, for one moment, lent an ear to suggestions of an opposite tendency, though, to all appearance, coming from the ministers themselves.—Thus baffled in their projects, with regard to Mr. Pitt, we should not be surprized if the ministers were, in case of necessity, to have recourse to the old opposition, who must be well convinced, that they can never hope to come into power as a predominant party. This has been long in contemplation, amongst the Addingtons, and would, indeed, be no more than the fulfilment of the threat, which they threw out against Mr. Pitt, in January last, when they declared: "the necessity of such an union we can only in *one case* anticipate; and that is one which, of all others, we must deprecate, but about which we are quite at ease." This case will, probably, very soon arise, and we shall be greatly deceived, if, in order to prolong their power and profits for a few months, they do not put their menace in execution. Some persons affect

to believe, that Messrs. Fox, Sheridan, &c. would object to such a junction; that they would refuse to become the instruments, the mere props of Addingtonian ambition, the dernier resort, the pis-aller, of men whom they have described as "the *sitting-part*" of their great opponents; but, alas! little does he know of the majority of the old opposition, totally must he have forgotten their conduct for ten years past, who imagines that their zeal to serve their country is to be restrained by any paltry considerations of character. Nor would such a coalition be at all unpopular. The Jenkinsons and Addingtons have, already with them, all the selfish, all the hypocritical, and all the cowardly part of the nation; the old opposition would bring the rabble; and, it would be to slander the common sense of our readers, to attempt to prove, that these two classes make nine-tenths, at least, of the nation: so that, amidst the never-ceasing din of "capital, credit and confidence," "and of cant, cowardice, and clamour, the voice of honour and of wisdom would be drowned, and the qualities themselves would soon be unknown in the land.—This coalition, however, will, as the Addingtons observed, be the work of "necessity." They will not receive the Maidstone opposition, if they can hobble on, in any way, without them. Not that they will be restrained by considerations of shame, or of respect for the repugnant feelings of their royal and much-abused Master: interest, their own private emolument, is the only obstacle that will stand, and that already has stood, in the way of the junction of which we are now speaking. This interest, this emolument, will still urge them to make almost any sacrifice of public good, rather than admit amongst them any associates at all, and particularly such as have experienced a twenty years fast, and whose voracious appetites nothing short of another Galilean miracle could possibly satisfy. Well aware of the difficulty to be apprehended on this last-mentioned account, the ministers will endeavour to stand alone; and, as they know, that they could not do so in open war, they will make another effort to preserve, not the "blessing of peace," but the misapplied name of that blessing, by which means they will again have the approbation of Buonaparté, they will again become "the prudent ministry who govern Great Britain," and with this support at their back, they know, that they shall be able to set at defiance, the united forces of all the parties, into which the state is divided.—It being now notorious, that the shallow scheme of entrapping Mr. Pitt, of bringing in him and Lord Melville only, has failed, the ministerial writers



are endeavouring to make the public believe, that Mr. Pitt proposed a further change, which would have embraced Lord's Spencer and Grenville, and Mr. Windham; but, that Mr. Addington would not consent to this, and, *thereupon*, the negotiation broke off. But, is there, can there be, a man in England, one single man, who knows, or has ever heard of the character of these noblemen, and of this gentleman, distinguished not less by their birth and by their talents, than by their integrity, and their high and honourable way of thinking, of speaking, and of acting; is it possible that any such man will believe, that any of them would, on any account whatever, become the underlings of the Addingtons, and, at the same time, give, from the paltry considerations of place, their tacit sanction to measures, which they have constantly deprecated, as fraught with the ruin and eternal disgrace of their country? Mr. Windham is, indeed, in most of the writings to which we allude, left out of this fabricated proposition, an honour which he certainly merits, but which he ought not to enjoy at the expense of Lord's Spencer and Grenville, who would, with disdain not less than his, spurn at such an impudent attempt to render them the tools of men, whose public conduct they have openly condemned, and whom, in their hearts, they must despise. From a ministry, made up of such heterogeneous materials, what good could be expected? In a cabinet composed of such jarring elements, what harmony could possibly exist? To justify measures commensurate with the exigencies of the times, the new ministry must necessarily begin by an unreserved exposition of all the dangers of the country; and, how would it be possible to describe and characterise those dangers, without an implied, and, in many cases, a clearly expressed, condemnation of the measures, by which they had been produced? One half of a ministry, thus patched up, would, on every subject at all connected with the effects of the peace, be constantly at war with the other half; its existence, consequently, would be of short duration, and, with it, would sink beyond the power of resuscitation, the character of all its newly acquired members. And, as to the effect which such a junction would have upon the country; would it inspire confidence in the people? Would it tend to rouse them from that death-like disgust and indifference, into which they have sunk through a long series of humiliating and disgraceful concessions? Would it not, rather, confirm that disgust, by presenting to their view what they must regard as a juggle

amongst a few inconsistent, not to say unprincipled, political men, of whom they, their King and their Country were the sport? In short, and, indeed, it is a truth, almost too evident to mention, such a compromise, would prove the annihilation of public confidence; it would bereave us even of hope; it would, at once, lead this devoted country to the execution of that "death-warrant," which was signed on the first of October, 1801! —

PEACE OR WAR?—Neither. We shall have neither peace nor war; but a continuation of this war-peace, which has, for eighteen months past, been preparing this country for the rule of Buonaparté and his comrades. The object of the ministers, the sole object which they have at heart, is, to retain their places; to this point, and to this point alone, all their negotiations, all their intrigues, all their words, and all their silence, tend. There is but one thing in the world, about which they are more anxious; and that is their personal safety! That secured, therefore, it is our full persuasion, as it invariably has been, that they will make any sacrifice that Buonaparté can demand, and much greater sacrifices, than, perhaps, he has hitherto thought of demanding. They are, however, aware, that something must be found out to make a show of compensation for the present alarm, stagnation of commerce, and public expense. For this purpose an accommodation, a mean, senseless, and useless accommodation, relative to Malta, will probably take place: an agreement may be made to leave that post in our hands for a year or two; and, in return, we shall, in all likelihood, consent to something, which will be ten times more destructive to the essential interests, as well as the honour of the country. This has always been our opinion; it is so still; and, if it should prove unfounded, we shall readily confess, that, for once in our lives, we have overrated the selfishness and pusillanimity of the Richmond-Park Ministers. — Some few things it will, nevertheless, be difficult easily to get over. His Majesty's Message states, as the leading and principal cause, of his calling upon the Parliament, that France has assembled a great number of troops in Holland. It is notorious, that, since the Message, the French troops in Holland have been augmented from five to twenty-five or thirty thousand, if we include those evidently intended for the expedition to Louisiana, who are now disembarked, and who come under the description of those, who had occasioned the alarm. Will the ministers, then, have the assurance to tell



Parliament, that the dispute is settled, and that there is no longer any ground of alarm; and will they disembody the militia, while these troops, or any considerable part thereof, remain in Holland? If there was not *imminent danger of invasion*, it was, as we have before observed, not only wrong, but it was absolutely illegal, to call out the militia; and, if that danger existed, previous to the date of the message, it must continue to exist, till the number of troops in Holland be reduced, something, at least, below what it then was. Will the people, will the parliament, be satisfied with a vague assurance, that the Consul of France has returned to a pacific disposition? Ashamed as we are to make the acknowledgment, we confess that we think they will. The Addingtons and Hawkesburies well know with whom they have to do. They well know, that, in spite of a little buff and bluster, the word peace, the name of peace; has, in this humbled and degraded country, charms similar to those, which poets have attributed to music. It will, however, be curious to hear the language, in which Mr. Sheridan \* will express himself on the approaching occasion; how he will lash the sanguinary war faction; what pathetic eulogiums he will utter on the lovely goddess of the olive branch; and with what a complacent mein and theatrical air he will put up his dagger of lath! —As to the New Opposition, whom the modest ministers, or their hirelings (no matter which) have denominated a "*little band of BLOOD-HOUNDS*," they, indeed, may, we hope, be expected to express a wish, at least, to institute some inquiry into the late unprecedented measures; though we have little doubt, that they would fail of obtaining it. The stale charge of disheartening the country becoming no longer suitable to "existing circumstances" (wretched, destructive phrase!), the staler one of wishing for *eternal war* will be revived, and will be persisted in, with as much falsehood, and with more assurance, than ever. Never have these noblemen and gentlemen, in any one instance, called for *eternal war*. They have denied the charge, over and over again, in their places in Parliament. Never have

\* MR. SHERIDAN, like Falstaff, is not only witty himself, but the occasion of wit in others. We did not flatter ourselves that the remarks, which we made on his famous bluster-speech (p. 385) would have become a subject for the fine arts, as it has, in the hands of Mr. GILRAY, of St. James's street, who has presented our ideas to the public in the form of an heroic picture, which will, we doubt not, tend to immortalize both the hero and the artist. It is a striking likeness, and the dexterity is peculiarly appropriate.

they said, that they would not, upon proper terms, have made peace with Buonaparté. Never have they said, or done, any thing to prevent, or to impede, the due and honourable execution of the definitive treaty of peace. Look at the Address, which, during the debates on that disgraceful compact, they proposed to be carried to the King. — "We shall," say they, "consider it as our first duty, as far as may depend on us, to *maintain inviolate the public faith, as it is pledged by this treaty*, and to assist His Majesty in performing, *with uprightness and punctuality*, the engagements, into which His Majesty has been advised to enter. But, we cannot conceal the painful apprehensions, with which we consider the result of those engagements; nor can we forbear to offer His Majesty our humble and dutiful advice, for the adoption of such measures, as can, alone, in our opinion, under the blessings of Providence, avert from us the dangers, with which we are now surrounded. That it is impossible for us to have seen without the utmost anxiety and alarm, all the unexampled circumstances which have attended the final conclusion of the present peace: the extensive and important sacrifices, which, without any corresponding concession, this Treaty has added to those already made, on our part, by the preliminary articles: the unlooked-for and immense accessions of territory, influence and power, which it has tacitly confirmed to France: the numerous subjects of *clashing interest and unavoidable dispute*, which it has left entirely unadjusted: and above all, those continued and systematic *projects of aggrandizement*, of which, in the very moment of peace, we have seen unhappily such undeniable and convincing evidence. That by relinquishing so many sources of prosperity in peace, and so many bulwarks of defence in war, and by renouncing at the same time the advantage and security always hitherto derived from the accustomed renewal of former treaties, the British Government has imposed on itself a greater necessity than has ever before existed, for measures of increased precaution, and for determinations of unshaken constancy. — That we therefore rely on His Majesty's paternal wisdom for a watchful and *unremitted attention to the situation and future conduct of the power with whom we have negotiated*. And we think it necessary more especially to assure His Majesty of our ready and firm support in that determination which we trust His Majesty will henceforward steadily pur-



"sue, of resisting every fresh encroachment (of whatever nature), which shall be attempted on the maritime, commercial, or colonial rights and interests of the British Empire.—This our solemn declaration must, as we believe, materially conduce to prevent the necessity which it is calculated to meet. And we trust that His Majesty will also approve of our desire to support it by all practicable economy, in every branch of the public expenditure, and by a scale of naval and military defence adequate to the extent of our danger, and to the importance of the interests which we have to maintain.—The anxiety which we feel in this respect is the necessary consequence of our sincere wish for the permanence of the public tranquillity which His Majesty now has re-established. And it is for the same important purpose, that we also most earnestly recommend to His Majesty's wisdom, the pressing necessity of arranging, by immediate and amicable discussion, those points of essential interest, which had been adjusted by former treaties, but for which no provision has been made in this negotiation.—These councils we submit to His Majesty with confidence, in the present awful crisis of public affairs, prepared to meet with firmness all the difficulties and dangers of our present situation, but desirous, above all things, to promote the stability and security of real peace: the object which it has been His Majesty's benevolent desire, by such extensive sacrifice, to ensure to his loyal and affectionate people."—Was this, then, to call for eternal war? Never was there so scandalous a misrepresentation of the conduct or the views of any party, or of any individual.—Let the people now ask themselves, whether the apprehensions of this party were not well founded. Has not France pursued "her projects of aggrandizement?" Have not "numerous subjects of clashing interest and dispute" arisen? Are we not surrounded with dangers of every sort? And, let any one deny, if he can, that, if the councils here proposed had been followed, we should never have been exposed to the peril and the contempt, with which we are now beset. This address recommended a "strict maintenance of the public faith, as pledged by the treaty," a fulfilment of the treaty "with uprightness and punctuality." Have the ministers, the makers and lovers of peace, followed this advice? Have they "maintained the public faith inviolate?" Have

they fulfilled the treaty with "uprightness and punctuality," as recommended by Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and their friends; France accuses them of not having done the former, and all the world knows that they have not done the latter, because, as to several points, they have not fulfilled the treaty at all: and in consequence of this very non-fulfilment, they have been compelled, at the end of ten months from the ratification of the treaty, to call upon the country to arm, in order to protect itself against imminent danger of invasion from the power with which that treaty was made; a danger which would not have happened, if the councils of the new opposition had not been rejected. While the appearance of peace and amity with France subsisted, it was to be supposed, that these gentlemen would continue to be reproached with a fondness of war; but, to hear this reproach now, and from men, too who have already again placed the nation in hostile array; to hear them arraigned for a love of war, as exemplified in their disapprobation of the treaty; to hear them thus arraigned, at the very moment when a war has been produced by that treaty, argues, on the part of their opponents, a degree of impudence, or of ignorance, unparalleled.

## NOTICES.

We are desired to say that our friend CANDIDUS, of Reading, who favoured us with the song (p. 398), entitled "Boa and the Doctor," is not the same Mr. CANDIDUS, who, some time ago, published some letters in a newspaper, called the STAR.

AN ENGLISHMAN, on Lord St. Vincent and the Navy, shall appear in our next sheet.

MISO-COSMOPOLIS shall see his excellent letter in our next.

J. B.'s Letter will appear in our next. His observations are invaluable, and we shall be much obliged to him for the pamphlet, which he has had the goodness to offer us.

PHILO-MELITENSIS has our thanks, and shall certainly have a place in our next.

SEVERAL PIECES OF POETRY (the ministry seem to have awakened the Muses) shall be inserted without delay.

In order to be able to communicate these articles, and other important matters, to our Readers, we shall, with our next, publish a SUPPLEMENTARY SHEET.

\* \* The two preceding sheets of the present volume, containing Mr. Cobbett's first and second letters to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the finances of the country, have been reprinted, and are now ready for delivery.